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Abstract
In this paper I offer a philosophical analysis of the act of ‘liking’ a post on social
media. First, I consider what it means to ‘like’ something. I argue that ‘liking’ is
best understood as a phatic gesture; it signals uptake and anoints the poster’s positive
face. Next, I consider how best to theorise the power that comes with amassing many
‘likes’. I suggest that ‘like’ tallies alongside posts institute and record a form of digital
social capital. Finally, I consider whether ‘likes’ have ultimately improved online dis-
course. I argue that while the ‘liking’ function itself is relatively innocuous, public
‘like’ tallies introduce a corrosive motivation to online communication. By making
the prospect of increased social capital perpetually salient to us, they encourage us
to prioritise high levels of engagement over meaningful engagement.
Imagine that you just published a paper in a philosophy journal,
and you share the good news in a Facebook status. Later, you are no-
tified that a colleague has ‘liked’ your post. This ‘like’ does not neces-
sarilymean that your colleague likes the post in question, nor that they
like your paper, nor that they like you, yet you will likely welcome it
all the same. What exactly has your colleague done, and why does it
make you happy?
‘Liking’ is a sui generis communicative act, only possible online,
which is easy to perform; one simply clicks on a symbol (often a
thumbs up) alongside a post on a social media platform. The ‘like’
is then added to a tally displayed alongside the post.1 This tally
both records and constitutes an interesting form of social currency.
Since its introduction in the late 2000s, ‘liking’ has transformed how
we interact online. Yet the nature of this act proves hard to specify. This
has caused problems in the legal realm; several courts have grappled
with how to conceive of the wrongdoing (if any) involved in ‘liking’ de-
famatory or hateful content online. The power that accrued ‘likes’ offer
has also proved hard to classify, despite being highly sought after. It
seems related to but not quite the same thing as popularity or esteem.
In this paper I embark on three interrelated projects. In Part 1,
I consider what we are doing when we ‘like’ a post on social media.
*This paper was the joint winner of the 2020 Philosophy essay prize.
1 I use quotation marks to refer to the social media function of ‘liking’,
and I omit quotation marks when referring to enjoying or taking pleasure in
something.
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I argue that the function of ‘liking’ is to build social ties and boost the
poster’s ‘positive face’. ‘Likes’ are in this sense analogous to gestures
like smiles or nods. Contrary to some court judgements, ‘liking’ is
therefore not necessarily a form of endorsement. In Part 2, I consider
how we should understand the power that comes with accruing many
‘likes’. I argue that this is best modelled as a digital form of what
Pierre Bourdieu calls ‘social capital’.
InPart 3, I reflect onwhether ‘likes’have ultimately improvedonline
communication. I argue that though the ‘like’ function makes it easier
to gauge uptake and gives us useful data about the distribution of online
social capital, the knowledge it creates also distorts communicative
practices. By making the prospect of increased social capital perpetu-
ally salient to us, it encourages us to attract others’ attention at the
expense of telling the truth. It can also incline us to construct insular
online communities where we can count on regular ‘likes’ from like-
minded people. Thus the ‘like’ function might contribute to both
the proliferation of fake news and increased political polarisation.
1. What is ‘liking’?
The internet has transformed the scope and scale of communication;
it is now easy, fast, and cheap to communicate with someone any-
where in the world, even a total stranger, and we can amass and
address enormously large audiences from the comfort of our
homes. More interestingly, the internet, and especially social
media, has also changed what it means to communicate. As Neri
Marsili observes, we can use social media to perform not only the
same communicative acts we perform offline, but also communicative
acts like retweeting and ‘liking’, which are only made possible by the
complex interfaces of social media platforms (Marsili, forthcoming).
Internet communicators have also developed and/or popularised
other innovative forms of communication, including reaction GIFs,
emojis, bodily reaction initialisms like ‘LOL’, and memes.
These forms of communication are now commonplace for the 3.8
billion active users of social media, each of whom uses it for an
average of almost two and a half hours a day (Kemp, 2020). Yet
they are rarely discussed in contemporary philosophy of language,
which still tends to focus on face-to-face, one-on-one spoken inter-
action.2 It is therefore high time that we expand our scope. In this
2 For example, a recent edited volume entitled ‘New Work on Speech
Acts’ does not mention online speech (Fogal et al, 2018). None of this is
2
Lucy McDonald
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 14 May 2021 at 12:35:39, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.
paper I shine a light on one particular form of online communication:
the act of ‘liking’ a social media post.
This tiny act could seem inconsequential or frivolous. After all, to
‘like’ a post is simply to press a button. Yet it is of huge social signifi-
cance. With ‘likes’ come considerable power; one can now make a
career out of being a social media ‘influencer’, i.e. a person who de-
liberately cultivates ‘likes’ and other forms of engagement on social
media to attract sponsorships and advertising deals. In addition,
the data constituted by ‘likes’ have been marshalled by social media
platforms, advertising agencies, and political campaigns for
financial and political gain.
‘Liking’ posts can also have legal ramifications. In 2020, judges in
Zurich ruled that ‘liking’ a social media post could constitute legally
actionable defamation or slander, if the post you ‘like’ has defamatory
or slanderous content. This is because, the court ruled, ‘liking’ such a
post amounts to both endorsement and dissemination of its content.3
Many people around the world have found themselves in hot water
for ‘liking’ posts. For example in the UK, India, and Thailand,
people have been questioned or arrested for ‘likes’ which were
deemed equivalent to harassment, heresy, or defamation.4
There is a need, then, for careful examination of what it means to
‘like’ a post, and what it means to amass ‘likes’. Such is the project
to say that there is no philosophical work at all on internet communication,
however. The field is growing, with work on retweeting (Marsili, forthcom-
ing); online echo chambers (Nguyen, 2020a); pseudonymous online speech
(Brennan & Pettit, 2004b); fake news (Rini, 2017; Mukerji, 2018; Habgood-
Coote, 2019; Pepp, Michaelson, and Sterken, 2019); online hate speech
(Brison and Gelber, 2019); memes (Evnine, 2018); and online shaming
(Norlock, 2017).
3 Urteil vom 29. Mai 2017 (Geschäfts-Nr. GG160246).
4 Michael Mutch and Mark Page, ‘Man quizzed by police after liking
“offensive transgender limerick” challenging hate crime rules in court’,
Grimsby Live, May 13, 2019, https://www.grimsbytelegraph.co.uk/news/
local-news/police-twitter-transgender-limerick-court-2861293;
Dominique Mosbergen, ‘Indian Women Arrested Over Facebook Post
Questioning Mumbai’s “Bal Thackeray” Shutdown’, Huffington Post,
November 19, 2012, https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/india-face-
book-arrest-women-post-questioning-mumbai-bal-thackeray-shutdown_
n_2159307?ri18n=true&guccounter=1; Agence France-Presse, ‘Thai man
arrested for Facebook “like” of doctored royal photo’, The Guardian,
December 10, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/10/
thai-man-arrested-facebook-like-photo-king.
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of this paper. For simplicity and space, I will focus on what it means
to ‘like’ a text post, rather than a photo or video. Though one can
‘like’ posts on most social media platforms, I will focus on
Facebook ‘likes’, because Facebook, with over 2.4 billion users, is
the largest of these platforms. Much of what I say about ‘liking’
text posts will apply to ‘liking’ other content, and much of what
I say about Facebook ‘likes’ will apply to ‘likes’ on other social
media platforms, even if some platforms have slightly different com-
municative norms.
I will also set aside the ‘reaction’ functions Facebook recently
introduced, which include ‘Care’, ‘Angry’, ‘Wow’, ‘Haha’, ‘Sad’,
and ‘Love’.Marsili observes that these reactions have amore straight-
forward communicative value than ‘likes’ (forthcoming). For
example, he suggests that to react with ‘haha’ is to express amuse-
ment, and to react with ‘angry’ is to express anger. In contrast,
‘liking’ a post is ‘vaguer and less defined’ (Marsili, forthcoming).
Indeed, the Facebook ‘like’ button does not have a face emoji like
the others; it is a thumbs up symbol, which might suggest that
‘liking’ has a gestural function rather than an expressive function.5
I will also focus primarily on ‘likes’ enacted and accrued by indi-
vidual social media users. These, I suggest, are paradigmatic ‘likes’,
whilst ‘likes’ enacted and accrued by corporations, like Adidas or
McDonald’s, are somewhat aberrant. ‘Liking’ is fundamentally a
way for individuals to interact with each other, and its adaptation
by corporations is parasitic on its basic interpersonal function. That
corporate ‘likes’ may sometimes not quite fit the theory of ‘liking’
I will advance is therefore not concerning.
It is tempting to think of ‘liking’ as equivalent to asserting the
proposition ‘I like this’. After all, when Leah Pearlman, a product
manager at Facebook, first introduced the function in a blog post,
she wrote: ‘When your friends share something great, let them
5 Interestingly, most social media platforms (except YouTube) lack a
‘dislike’ button. CEO Mark Zuckerberg says of Facebook: ‘We didn’t
want to just build a Dislike button because we don’t want to turn
Facebook into a forum where people are voting up or down on people’s
posts. That doesn’t seem like the kind of community we want to create.
You don’t want to go through the process of sharing some moment that’s
important to you in your day and then have someone down vote it.’
(‘Q&A with Mark’, September 15, 2015, https://www.facebook.com/
watch/?ref=external&v=992176984173410). This comment indicates a con-
trasting optimism about the social effects of the ‘like’ button which,
I suggest in §3, may be ill-founded.
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know you like it’.6 Presumably, those who regard ‘liking’ as a form of
endorsement, like the judges in the previously mentioned Zurich
case, have something like this interpretation in mind. To endorse
something is to declare one’s approval of or support for it. ‘Liking’,
on this interpretation, does just that.
This analysis of ‘liking’ could explain why accruing ‘likes’ is enjoy-
able –we all want to know that other people like our content. It could
also explain why ‘likes’ are often ambiguous. Sometimes, we ‘like’ a
post because we like its content. For example, we ‘like’ a friend’s
post about getting a job because we are pleased to learn that they
got a job. Other times, we ‘like’ a post because we like the fact that
it was posted, even if we dislike its content. We might like a
friend’s post quoting an offensive remark by a politician, not
because we like what the politician said, but because we like the fact
that the friend has drawn attention to the politician’s bigotry. Just
as ‘likes’ are ambiguous, the referent of ‘this’ is often ambiguous,
too. When we say, ‘I like this’, we either gesture to the ‘this’ in ques-
tion, or assume that others will infer its referent based on the context.
‘Liking’ seems to work similarly – we are left to figure out to what
exactly it refers.
Yet there are good reasons to doubt that ‘likes’ have this propos-
itional content. If they did, they would likely be regarded as standa-
lone contributions to online conversations, yet this is not the case.
Unlike online text, photos, videos, GIFs, and audio, ‘likes’ are not
generally regarded as a kind of digital content contributing to
online discourse, i.e. as something consumed and engaged with on
its own terms. Moreover, if ‘likes’ had propositional content, we
would expect there to be disputes about the truthfulness of ‘likes’,
in the same way there are disputes about the truthfulness of text
posts. Yet this isn’t the case, presumably because ‘likes’ are not inter-
preted as expressing propositions.
Instead, ‘likes’ seem more likely to express some non-cognitive
content, like the (real or purported) affective states of users, in response
to other peoples’ conversational contributions. Maybe, then, we
should model them as equivalent to saying ‘Woo!’, ‘Yeah!’, or ‘Yay!’.
This analysis of ‘liking’ reflects the phenomenology of ‘liking’ in
many cases. When we ‘like’ a post about a friend’s new job, we often
want to express positive emotions in response to their news.
Yet any account of ‘likes’ as expressing a positive attitude or
emotion, cognitively or non-cognitively, ultimately falls short,
6 Leah Pearlman, ‘I like this’, Facebook, February 10, 2009, https://
www.facebook.com/notes/facebook/i-like-this/53024537130/.
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because ‘likes’ do not always involve expressing positive attitudes and
emotions. For example, sometimes we ‘like’ sad posts, such as those
sharing information about bereavements and traumatic events, even
though we do not wish to convey that we are happy about these
events, nor the fact that the posters had to write about them. We
might not feel any positive emotions towards any aspect of the post
at all.7 Sometimes we ‘like’ a post to signal that we share the senti-
ments expressed; we might ‘like’ a post criticising a political policy
because we share the bitterness expressed by poster.8
In fact, we have good reason to abandon any attempt to identify
some stable content, cognitive or non-cognitive, which ‘likes’
express. ‘Likes’ seem to transmit many different kinds of informa-
tion; their ‘content’ is not stable, and they have no recognisable, con-
ventional ‘meaning’. As such, any content-based definition of ‘liking’
seems doomed. What does seem to be stable, however, is the social
function of ‘liking’. This indicates that we may gain more traction
with a functional definition.
I propose that ‘likes’ are best theorised as serving a social, or, more
specifically, phatic function (a function curiously neglected in
philosophy of language). The notion of phatic discourse was first
developed by anthropologist Bronisław Malinowski, in his analysis
of ‘phatic communion’, a ‘type of speech in which ties of union are
created by a mere exchange of words’:
Are words in Phatic Communion used primarily to convey
meaning, the meaning which is symbolically theirs? Certainly
not! They fulfil a social function and that is their principal aim,
7 The awkwardness of ‘liking’ sad posts may have precipitated the intro-
duction of other reaction functions on Facebook. Yet it is still not unusual or
impolite to ‘like’ a sad post on Facebook. On other social media platforms,
which do not have other reaction functions, it is standard to ‘like’ sad
posts. For example, an Instagram post announcing the death of actor
Chadwick Boseman in August 2020 has, as of March 25, 2021, over 19
million likes (@Chadwickboseman, ‘It is with immeasurable grief […]’,
Instagram photo, August 29, 2020, https://www.instagram.com/p/
CEdLs05FWTn).
8 I refer to ‘posters’ and not ‘authors’ or ‘creators’ partly because this is
the standard terminology of internet discourse and partly because to post
something does not necessarily mean to author it. Many social media
users reuse others’ content, e.g. they quote others’ text, or share others’
photos. When we ‘like’ someone’s post, we are ‘liking’ something they up-
loaded or shared, but not necessarily something they created. There are
many interesting questions about authorship on the internet, as well as
about whether social media platforms themselves count as publishers.
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but they are neither the result of intellectual reflection, nor do
they necessarily arouse reflection in the listener. Once again we
may say that language does not function here as a means of trans-
mission of thought. […] [Phatic communion] consists in just this
atmosphere of sociability and in the fact of the personal commu-
nion of these people. But this is in fact achieved by speech, and
the situation in all such cases is created by the exchange of
words, by the specific feelings which form convivial gregarious-
ness, by the give and take of utterances which make up ordinary
gossip. The whole situation consists in what happens linguistic-
ally. Each utterance is an act serving the direct aim of binding
hearer to speaker by a tie of some social sentiment or other.
(Malinowski, 1923, p. 315)
We have various aims when communicating with one another.
Sometimes, we communicate because we want to increase the
common stock of knowledge in the conversation or achieve an align-
ment of beliefs. Sometimes, we want to use communication to build
social bonds and bring people together ‘by the mere need of compan-
ionship’ (Malinowski 1923, p. 316). Phatic discourse, as characterised
by Malinowski, is concerned only with the latter goals. This kind of
discourse is often characterised as ‘small talk’, and is exemplified by
ritual exchanges of ‘How are you?’ and ‘Fine, thanks, how are you?’,
as well as ‘purposeless expressions of preference or aversions, ac-
counts of irrelevant happenings, comments on what is perfectly
obvious’ (1923, p. 314). During small talk we might share informa-
tion with one another, but that information is often arbitrary and/
or irrelevant, and its transfer serves an instrumental function.
When making small talk with someone about the weather, for
example, we likely do not really care about the weather, nor our inter-
locutor’s preferences about the weather, and we may already know
everything they tell us about the weather. Yet we exchange these
pleasantries because doing so facilitates camaraderie.
Sometimes, entire conversations have a phatic function, and other
times, individual communicative acts within conversations have a
phatic function. They might have this incidentally (for example, one
might make an assertion about the weather for phatic reasons), or
they might have it essentially; some acts are definable in terms of
their phatic function. Consider, for example, the speech act of greeting
someone, or gestures likewaving, shaking hands, smiling, andnodding.
Tounderstandwhat these acts are,wemust understand thephatic func-
tion they fulfil. ‘Liking’, I propose, is best theorised as a similar kind of
essentially phatic act. It seems to fulfil at least two phatic functions.
7
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Firstly, ‘liking’ helps institute and maintain connections by enab-
ling social media users to make posters aware that their content is
being seen, i.e. it provides evidence of uptake. Uptake is to be under-
stood as the hearer’s receipt of another person’s message; it involves
hearing/reading that message and coming to a particular interpret-
ation of it.9 Posting online can feel like shouting into the void, as
we do not get any immediate signs of uptake from our interlocutors;
we cannot see them meeting our gaze or nodding, nor can we hear
them performing interjections like ‘Oh’, ‘Yeh’ and ‘Mhmm’. The
latter behaviours, known in linguistics as ‘backchannel responses’
(Yngve, 1970), tell us that someone is actively listening to us
speak.10 ‘Likes’ serve a similar function. Just like the backchannel re-
sponse, ‘Mhmm’, ‘likes’ need not have any content, but rather they
simply signal to the poster that their post has been seen, i.e. that
they aren’t shouting into the void.
‘Liking’ each other’s posts is often considered a requirement of
online friendship. Many people ‘like’ friends’ posts routinely and
out of a sense of obligation, without really reading or engaging with
them. This is good evidence that ‘liking’ functions to signal uptake;
we expect our friends to listen to us, not to ignore us, and so
‘liking’ posts helps reassure people that they have an audience,
which is still listening and engaged.11
Secondly, ‘likes’ function to anoint the ‘positive face’ of the
poster.12 This claim requires some unpacking. Politeness theorists
Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson characterise a person’s posi-
tive face as their positive self-image (1987, p. 61). When we speak of
‘saving face’, this is what we have in mind; we like to think that we are
held in high regard by other people, and we try to avoid situations in
which others might come to think less of us; we try to preserve our
positive face.13 Politeness dictates that we should preserve and
9 For a more detailed account of uptake, see McDonald (forthcoming).
10 On the epistemology of backchannel responses, see Nagel (2019).
11 Many other acts on social media can serve phatic functions, but do
not do so necessarily. For example, we might expect friends to regularly
retweet and share our posts, as well as ‘liking’ them. This does not entail
that retweeting and sharing are essentially phatic acts. Retweeting, for
example, is best theorised as a kind of ostension (Marsili, forthcoming).
In contrast, I am proposing that the primary function of ‘liking’ is phatic.
12 This analysis does not work for cases in which we ‘like’ corporate
content, because it’s not clear that corporations can have positive face.
13 Brown and Levinson contrast positive face with negative face, which
is a person’s ‘basic claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to non-dis-
traction’ (1987, p. 61), i.e. a kind of freedom of action. Our concern for
8
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anoint the positive face of other people, too; this is known as positive
politeness.We can do this in a number of ways, including attending to
a person’s interests/wants/needs, showing approval and sympathy
towards them, agreeing with them, presupposing or asserting
common ground with them, joking with them, extending offers
and promises, and giving them gifts (1987, p. 322).
‘Liking’, I propose, is a similar kind of positive face preservation.
Facebook was probably not so-called because its founders took an
interest in sociolinguistic work on politeness. Yet it is striking that
one of the most well-known functions of the platform seems to
have this face-preserving function. I argued earlier that ‘likes’ do
not necessarily express positive emotions, nor convey that the ‘liker’
actually likes the post. Yet their function, overall, is still positive.
When you ‘like’ a post, your ‘like’ will be added to a tally next to
the post, and if you have ‘friends’ on the platform, they may see on
their newsfeeds that you have ‘liked’ the post. To ‘like’ a post is
therefore to bestow a small gift upon the poster, specifically a gift
of recognition, (sometimes) increased visibility (due to social media
algorithms), and elevated social standing in the eyes of other users.
Unless they have tightly controlled, private accounts, social media
users communicate in the knowledge that their communicative acts
could be seen by many others. Positive face is closely tied up with
how we believe we are seen in the eyes of others, and so the publicity
of ‘likes’ contributes to their face-anointing effects.
The backchannel, uptake-signalling function and the politeness
function of ‘liking’may sound similar, and indeed most backchannel
responses are also acts of positive politeness, but the two functions
can come apart. One can engage in backchannel responses that are
not forms of positive politeness – for example one could signal
uptake by staring intensely at someone as they speak. And one can
engage in positive politeness strategies which are not backchannel
responses; for example, one might initiate a conversation with an
act of positive politeness (a handshake, a compliment, et cetera).
‘Liking’ seems to have both functions.
Described in this way, ‘liking’ seems to have an equivalent in
offline discourse: smiling or nodding. Such gestures typically
convey to a speaker that you have registered their speech – they
signal your uptake – and they are also polite, in so far as they preserve
others’ negative face explains why when we want someone to do something,
we typically say, ‘Would you mind doing x?’ rather than simply ‘Do x’ – the
former utterance is less of an imposition on the person’s freedom of action.
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the speaker’s positive face, especially when audiences are looking on.
This analysis can accommodate the fact that we ‘like’ posts we do not
actually like and do not wish to convey that we like. If a person tells us
a sad fact, we still signal our uptake and preserve that person’s face by
meeting their gaze, nodding, and performing other phatic gestures.
We ‘like’ sad posts for similar reasons.
This analysis is very minimal, in that instead of attributing a fixed
meaning to ‘liking’, it attributes a general function. This enables it to
accommodate the fact that ‘likes’ can have different social signifi-
cances in different contexts. The identities of the ‘liker’ and the
poster, the relationship between them, the content of the post, and
the general context, will all affect how exactly ‘likes’ are interpreted.
A ‘like’ out of the blue by a person who rarely interacts with the poster
might convey something quite different from a ‘like’ by a friend who
routinely ‘likes’ all posts. In different contexts, ‘likes’ can be olive
branches, flirtatious gestures, attempts to get back in touch, routine
demonstrations of friendship, or bestowals of prestige (if performed
by celebrities). Yet what all such ‘likes’ have in common is a basic
social function.
We are now in a better position to consider how ‘likes’ should be
treated in law. Is ‘liking’, as the Zurich case held, a form of both
endorsement and dissemination? Let us tackle the endorsement ques-
tion first. Endorsement is ‘the act of saying that you approve of or
support something or someone’.14 I have argued against interpreta-
tions of a ‘like’ as either an assertion of the claim ‘I like this’ or a
positive expressive act akin to saying ‘Yeah!’, as well as against the
idea that ‘likes’ have any stable content at all. Therefore ‘likes’ are
not necessarily endorsements (though they could be endorsements
in some contexts). The same is true of smiling or nodding at
someone – these are not necessarily endorsements of the person or
what they are saying. ‘Liking’ a post does not necessarily mean that
one endorses the post’s content, and so ‘liking’ defamatory content
should not necessarily count as endorsement of that content. To
treat ‘likes’ as endorsements by default would be to attribute too
substantive a conventional meaning to the act of ‘liking’ something.
Whether a ‘like’ is a form of dissemination, meanwhile, seems to
depend on the structure of the social media platform. In the Zurich
case, judges held that by ‘liking’ defamatory posts on Facebook, the
defendant ‘made them accessible to a large number of people’.
14 Cambridge English Dictionary Online, s.v. ‘endorsement (n.)’, ac-
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Given the defendant had other Facebook ‘friends’, this is true,
regardless of his intentions. ‘Liking’ posts on Facebook does share
them with one’s broader network, in so far as the ‘like’ and the
‘liked’ post may appear on the newsfeeds of the ‘friends’ and
‘followers’ of the ‘liker’ (depending on the obscure workings of the
Facebook algorithm), as well as, sometimes, on the profile of the
‘liker’. Thus a ‘like’ is likely to constitute an act of dissemination, if
dissemination is understood merely as sharing content with other
people, and provided the ‘liker’ has at least one ‘friend’ or ‘follower’.
That a ‘like’ can be an act of dissemination does not entail that
‘liking’ should constitute litigable dissemination in cases where the
content ‘liked’ is defamatory or hateful. One should also factor in
the size and identities of the audience, as well as the possibility of ac-
cidental ‘likes’. A ‘like’ can be performed with a single click, so it is
incredibly easy to accidentally ‘like’ something and thereby dissemin-
ate it. Establishing mens rea for ‘liking’ could therefore be difficult.
That is, if it is required at all; if a disseminating ‘like’ ends up
causing harm, then perhaps the ‘liker’ could be culpably negligent
or reckless, even if they did not explicitly intend to ‘like’ the post.
It is very easy to perform unintentional communicative acts online;
one can accidentally press buttons on social media platforms, send
emails to the wrong people, or paste the wrong text into instant mes-
senger. Internet users can also have their online identities hijacked
and have messages sent to others in their name. I lack the space to
examine the difficulties of attributing intention and authorship to
online communicators, but these issues should be taken seriously
when considering online crimes.
2. Being ‘liked’
I turn my focus now away from the act of ‘liking’ and towards the
‘like’ tally, which records and displays the number of ‘likes’ a post
has received. If one regularly accrues many ‘likes’ on many posts,
one develops a kind of power or status, with significant economic,
political, and social ramifications. ‘Like’ tallies both institute this
power, i.e. bring it into being, and serve as a measure of it, telling
us how much of it social media users possess. In this section I con-
sider how to theorise this power. I will argue that accrued ‘likes’ are
a digital form of what Pierre Bourdieu called ‘social capital’.
If ‘likes’ were acts of endorsement, then the number of ‘likes’ a
person accrues on their posts could be a measure of the esteem in
which they are held. Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit state that
11
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to hold someone in ‘esteem’ is to take up an evaluative attitude
towards them, based on a positive rating of the person against some
characteristic, compared with other people (Brennan and Pettit
2004a, p. 17). If many people take up this attitude towards you,
you can be said to possess the resource of esteem. Brennan and
Pettit suggest that esteem could play ‘an especially important role
on the Internet’, because the internet enables us to access large,
enthusiastic audiences (Brennan and Pettit, 2004b, p. 140).
Yet ‘likes’ are not necessarily acts of endorsement, and so ‘liking’ a
post doesn’t always signal that you hold the poster (or their post) in
esteem. Indeed, some people regularly accrue many ‘likes’ but are not
held in high esteem by the people ‘liking’ their posts; how many
‘likes’ someone has is not always a good guide to how people think of
them. In addition, ‘likes’ (and the power that comes with them) seem
to be a tradeable commodity, but, as Brennan and Pettit stress,
esteem cannot be traded: ‘However much people want esteem, it is an
untradeable commodity: there is no way that I can buy the good
opinion of another or sell to others my good opinion of them’ (2004a,
abstract). If esteem could be traded, it would cease to be esteem. Yet
‘likes’ can be traded. Some users buy the services of ‘click farms’,
where workers are paid to ‘like’ thousands of social media posts a
day.15 Other users do not buy but rather solicit ‘likes’; they tell users
that their ‘likes’ will constitute entries into competitions, or they ask
their followers to ‘like’ them in exchange for ‘shout-outs’ or as a favour.
For these reasons, we should not think of accrued likes as a reliable
measure of the esteem in which a person is held. A better way to con-
ceive of them can be found in Pierre Bourdieu’s work on capital.
Capital, for Bourdieu, is accumulated labour (1986, p. 241).
Ordinarily when we think of capital, we think of economic capital,
i.e. assets like financial resources, land, and property, which are ‘im-
mediately and directly convertible into money’ (1986, p. 242). It is
tempting to think that our social order is determined wholly by the
distribution of such capital and the systems which facilitate its
exchange. Yet Bourdieu argues that it is ‘impossible to account for
the structure and functioning of the social world’ unless one accounts
for the various forms of non-economic, immaterial capital (1986,
p. 242). If the social world were a casino, Bourdieu suggests, we
gamble not only with the black chips of economic capital, but also
15 Charles Arthur, ‘How low-paid workers at “click farms” create ap-
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with the blue chips of cultural capital and the red chips of social
capital (see Field, 2003, p. 14).
Cultural capital is a form of cultural knowledge and socialisation. A
person who is au faitwith contemporary literature and can talk about
it articulately, for example, possesses cultural capital.16 Cultural
capital facilitates upwards social mobility and the acquisition of
economic capital. The aforementioned person could leverage their
cultural capital to get into Oxford or Cambridge, and as a result of
the academic qualification then conferred (itself a form of cultural
capital), they may find it easier to get a high-paying job.
Social capital, meanwhile, is ‘the sum of resources, actual or
virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing
a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of
mutual acquaintance and recognition’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant,
1992, p. 119).17 The extent of one’s social capital depends both on
how many connections one has, and the capital (economic, cultural,
social) possessed by the people with whom one has connections.
Just like cultural capital, social capital facilitates the acquisition and
maintenance of economic capital. The phrase ‘It’s not what you
know but who you know’ alludes to the power of social capital;
even if you lack economic and cultural capital, you can mobilise
and exploit connections with people who do have these forms of
capital in order to acquire them.
When thinking about social capital, Bourdieu had inmind the con-
nections facilitated by old boys’ networks, unions, secret societies,
and sports clubs. Yet social media has radically transformed the
nature and extent of our social connections. Nowwe can develop con-
nections with people of all demographics, even if we have never met
them in real life, and we can have these interactions with thousands of
people around the world at any time and at low cost. These kinds of
connections are facilitated and constituted by functions such as
‘liking’. And so I suggest that the ‘like’ tally both institutes and
measures a digital form of social capital.
16 There are different forms of cultural capital, including embodied cul-
tural capital (values, skills, tastes, knowledge, mannerisms, and linguistic
practices), institutionalised cultural capital (academic qualifications and cre-
dentials), and objective cultural capital (physical objects like books and
works of art) (Bourdieu 1986, pp. 243–48).
17 James Coleman (1990) and Robert Putnam (2001) also offer theories
of social capital. Unlike Bourdieu, they conceive of social capital as a feature
of society as a whole; it is a network of connections between individuals
rather than something individuals accrue.
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The number of ‘friends’ one has may also be a measure of social
capital.18 Indeed, it may initially seem a better guide to social
capital than ‘like’ counts, since friendships are by definition forms
of social connection. I consider both ‘friends’ and ‘likes’ guides to
social capital, but ‘likes’ are a better guide to current social capital.
This is because ‘liking’ a post is a form of active engagement,
whereas ‘friending’ someone, once completed, requires no further
action. You can amass thousands of inactive ‘friends’who never inter-
act with you or your content. ‘Friending’ someone merely gives a re-
lationship formal recognition, whereas ‘liking’ posts is a form of
relationship upkeep. The more ‘likes’ you regularly accrue, the
more people are actively engaging with you.
This account of ‘likes’ is concordant withmy account of the ‘liking’
function. Social capital, for Bourdieu, reflects relationships of mere
‘acquaintance and recognition’, and I have argued that ‘liking’ is a
vehicle for signalling your recognition of someone’s presence
online. This account can also explain why one can have many
‘likes’ but lack popularity or esteem. One can have considerable
social capital, but still be widely disliked.
This account is also consonant with talk of the ‘like economy’
(Gerlitz and Helmond, 2013). This term reflects increasing recogni-
tion that ‘likes’ are a form of capital which is not obviously economic
nor cultural. The power that comes with ‘likes’ is often referred to in
contemporary internet discourse as ‘clout’, a word which historically
seemed to refer to a form of social capital. In 1973, journalist Mike
Royko wrote about clout and its role in Chicago society, defining it
as ‘political influence, as exercised through patronage, fixing,
money, favors, and other traditional City Hall methods’. He reported
people saying things like ‘I don’t need a building permit – I got clout
in City Hall’.19 ‘Clout’ has lost its connection to political influence in
particular, but the idea that it is a kind of social currency persists.
This is presumably why it is now used to refer to high engagement
levels on social media.20
18 ‘Likes’ and ‘friends’ often come together; if you get many ‘likes’, you
probably also have many ‘friends’. Yet they can also come apart; a viral post
can acquire many ‘likes’ even if the poster does not have many ‘friends’
(though they will likely start to accrue more as a result), and a person with
many ‘friends’ can nonetheless accrue zero ‘likes’ on their posts.
19 Mike Royko, ‘What Clout Is and Isn’t’, Chicago Daily News, June 7,
1973, http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/1465.html.
20 Klout.com, launched in 2008, offers users a comprehensive measure-
ment of their online ‘clout’, i.e. social capital, by analysing all forms of en-
gagement with a person’s various social media platforms. Users can leverage
14
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In addition, the social capital model captures the idea that one has
to work hard to acquire ‘likes’. The same is true of social capital,
which is the product of accumulated social labour. Bourdieu stresses
that acquiring and maintaining social capital requires an ‘unceasing
effort of sociability’ (1986, p. 250). One must work constantly to
transform contingent relationships into ‘social relationships that are
directly usable in the short or long term’ (1986, p. 249). For social
media ‘influencers’, this ‘unceasing effort of sociability’ is a full-time
job. To build an internet platform through ‘likes’, one must
constantly produce content, solicit engagement, and interact with
other users (especially those with many ‘likes’ themselves).21
Modelling ‘likes’ as a form of social capital can explain why with
more ‘likes’ often comesmore economic capital. ‘Likes’ cannot be im-
mediately and directly converted into money, nor can they be easily
transferred to other people. Yet high numbers of them can generate
lucrative advertising deals and career opportunities. All of this is con-
gruent with Bourdieu’s argument that the more social capital we
acquire, the greater our access to economic capital, even if the two
forms of capital cannot be directly exchanged. This explains why suc-
cessful social media influencers often enjoy rapid upwards social and
economic mobility, even if they start out with very limited capital.
Prior to social media, social capital was hard to measure. Indeed,
Bourdieu himself never specified how social capital could or should
be measured. ‘Like’ tallies have made social capital (or at least one
form of it) both more visible and more measurable online. I explore
some of the effects of this in the following section.
3. Should we like ‘likes’?
Social media is a complex ecosystem, of which the ‘like’ function is
one small part. Teasing out the individual effects of this system’s
discrete but interrelated functions and capabilities can be difficult.
Indeed, in many ethical debates about social media, for example con-
cerning surveillance capitalism, privacy, manipulative algorithms,
high scores for material gain, for example by taking advantage of ‘Klout for
Perks’ campaigns where companies offer free products in the hope of posi-
tive publicity in exchange.
21 Social media users who are already celebrities need not work so hard
at this, as their many offline connections will often translate into many
online connections.
15
Please Like This Paper
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 14 May 2021 at 12:35:39, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.
addiction, mental health, identity construction, online abuse, polit-
ical activism, and fake news, social media is treated as a single struc-
ture; social media as a whole is said to cause this or that problem.
Nonetheless, in this section, I try to home in on the impact the
‘like’ function in particular has had on online communicative
practices. I do not claim that ‘liking’ is the sole cause of the effects
I identify; similar points could well be made about other social
media functions. The following considerations are also somewhat
speculative; to draw more concrete conclusions would require
robust empirical evidence.
The ‘like’ function seems prima facie to have improved online com-
munication in at least one way, by making it easier. Before the intro-
duction of the ‘like’ function, social media users had two options after
reading someone’s post; they could leave a comment, or they could do
nothing. Commenting requires creativity, concentration, and time,
and so many chose instead to ‘lurk’, consuming content silently
and passively. The ‘like’ function changed this, by offering users a
quick and low-cost way of interacting with posters. If we think inter-
acting with others is a good thing, then anything that makes such in-
teractions easier (and as a result, probably more frequent) is surely
good, too. ‘Likes’ certainly make communication more satisfying
for online ‘speakers’, who can now know that they are being heard,
and that their communicative efforts have not gone ignored.
That said, this benefit will be outweighed, or at least reduced, if it
turns out that the ease of ‘liking’ has led us to forego more time-con-
suming but also more meaningful interactions in favour of higher
levels of less meaningful interactions. It may be that ‘liking’ is so
easy and takes so little effort that it encourages us to be lazy. Rather
than come up with a thoughtful response to someone’s post, we can
just ‘like’ it and continue on our way. In this way, the ‘like’ function
might actually be making us worse listeners/readers; it is a form of
pseudo-engagement which absolves us of the guilt of not responding
to others’ posts but creates the bare minimum of human connection.
These things are hard to assess without empirical data, but the
worries just outlined make me reluctant to conclude that the ‘like’
function has ultimately improved online communication simply by
making it more prevalent. The quality of our interactions seems to
matter as much as, if not more than, their quantity.
‘Like’ tallies, meanwhile, might seem to have improved online
communication by providing social media users with a new kind of
knowledge, in the form of quantified uptake. When we post some-
thing on social media, we get clear, objective information from our
‘like’ tally of how many people have acknowledged our post. This
16
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knowledge seems useful for a number of reasons.22 On a personal
level, ‘like’ data can help us gauge who and how big our audience
is, and so it enables us to better tailor our communication to them.
More generally, ‘likes’ are a useful way of measuring other people’s
social capital. This is particularly useful in political spheres; ‘like’
tallies give us concrete data about the influence of political figures.
This can help us take the political temperature during the run up
to elections and referenda, and it can also alert us to the growth of pol-
itical movements. Offline, social capital can be very hard to measure,
but online we can see its distribution clearly.
However, just as some kinds of interaction are more valuable than
others, so too are some kinds of knowledgemore valuable than others.
‘Like’ tallies do give us information we previously lacked, but this in-
formation seems to have had a number of corrosive effects on internet
discourse. These effects seem worrying enough to offset any particu-
lar benefits ‘like’ data may offer. I.e., it seems there may be some
things we are better off not knowing.
In particular, ‘like’ tallies seem to have created a new motivation in
our online communicative practices, which can override our commit-
ment to truth.With ‘likes’ comes social capital, which as noted earlier
can transmute into other forms of capital and generate various forms
of power and influence. For this reason, many of us will be driven to
produce content that attracts lots of ‘likes’. Of course, in offline
22 Social media platforms themselves profit greatly from ‘like’ data,
which they can use to make their platforms more addictive and to develop
targeted advertising campaigns. Many Facebook users get personalised
adverts for products and services on their feeds, which the platform
chooses for them on the basis of their ‘like’ history. ‘Like’ data has also
been harnessed for political ends; data-analytics firm Cambridge
Analytica was accused of using the data of over 50 million Facebook users,
without their express consent, to target people in swing states ahead of the
2016 US presidential election (See Carole Cadwalladr and Emma
Graham-Harrison, ‘Revealed: 50 million Facebook profiles harvested for
Cambridge Analytica in major data breach’, The Guardian, March 17,
2018, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-ana-
lytica-facebook-influence-us-election). The ethical issues posed by the
‘liking’ function itself could be separable from the ethical issues relating
to how social media companies use ‘liking’ data. Perhaps worries that this
data can be marshalled for political gain could be mitigated by greater regu-
lation of social media platforms, and perhaps worries about the privacy and
consent of ‘likers’ could be mitigated by more transparency about how data
is used, and the introduction of options to opt in or out of such usage.
17
Please Like This Paper
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 14 May 2021 at 12:35:39, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.
interactions we also desire social capital, but the ‘like’ tally makes the
capital-producing potential of online communication perpetually
salient, and it also reminds us that online, unlike offline, we have
almost infinitely large potential audiences.
Getting ‘likes’ is also addictive; it releases dopamine in the brain
that makes us want to come back for more. One study shows that
the same circuits in adolescent brains that are activated when they
win money or eat chocolate are also activated when they see large
numbers of ‘likes’ (Sherman et al., 2016). ‘Likes’ are a good
example of ‘gamification’, which C. Thi Nguyen defines as the intro-
duction of ‘game-like elements’ into our lives (2020b, p. 189).
Nguyen observes that gamification can be intentional, as in the case
of technology like the FitBit, or unintentional, if it occurs as a
result of metrics and quantification introduced to collate information
(Ibid).Metrics, Nguyen suggests, can ‘look a lot like points’, and they
can encourage us to ‘redefine our notions of success’ in the terms spe-
cified by those metrics, in order to get more ‘game-like pleasures’
(Ibid).23 Driven by the desire to accrue these points, we may ‘lose
ourselves in the pursuit’, leading us to set aside all other values and
commitments (2020b, p. 192).
The drive for ‘likes’ seems to encourage many of us to produce or
share shocking and attention-grabbing content, even if we are unsure
of its veracity and even it is divisive or hostile. If our audience has
thousands of posts to sift through, we need to say something dramatic
to get their (and the algorithm’s) attention.24 Thus the ‘like’ function
might partially explain why fake news proliferates on social
23 JamesWilliams observes similarly that social media metrics canmake
one ‘more competitive for other people’s attention and affirmation’ (2018,
p. 57). We come to value these ‘attentional signals’ for their own sake, and
social media becomes a ‘numbers game’ we want to win, even when it is
unclear what such winning would involve (Ibid).
24 I am assuming here that content which is likely to get picked up by
social media algorithms is also likely to receive ‘likes’ from the people who
view it. If algorithms are good at predicting what people will ‘like’, then
this is likely to be the case. Yet it need not be, in which case there might
be different ways of accruing many ‘likes’; designing content which is not
picked up by the algorithm, but which all your connections will ‘like’, or de-
signing content which people aren’t particularly inclined to ‘like’, but which
will be picked up by the algorithm, such that it ends up with many ‘likes’
simply because it has been seen by so many more people (a strategy particu-
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networking sites.25 Our desire for engagement with others, and the
social capital that comes with it, can make us care less about
whether the claims we make and share online are true, as well as
whether the content we share has been deliberately designed by
others to trigger our biases and vulnerabilities, or to serve some ne-
farious political goal. This makes social media users more vulnerable
to manipulation and can lead to the dissemination of harmful
ideologies.
This also hampers meaningful and productive political deliber-
ation online. If we are not interested in getting at the truth, but
only in getting ‘likes’, and if we know that others take this approach,
too, wewill not be interested in exchanging information, reasons, and
arguments with one another, but rather with fighting it out for the
most exciting online content. In its early days, the internet was her-
alded for its potential to improve democracy. Many thought the
internet could bring about what Jurgen Habermas calls the ‘ideal
speech situation’ (1973), a context in which agents can participate
in free, rational, and open democratic debate (Ess, 1996; Dahlberg,
1998).26 Yet the ‘like’ function has revitalised the age-old worry
that vivid rhetoric and emotional appeals will win out over rational
deliberation in democracies. It has done this by quantifying social
capital and making it ever-present in online communication,
thereby making demagoguery a more salient and tempting prospect
than ever before.
In addition, the desire for ‘likes’might also lead us to (consciously
or unconsciously) surround ourselves with people who share our in-
terests and commitments. Several social media analysts have observed
that social media creates ‘context collapse’ (boyd, 2002, 2010;
Marwick and boyd, 2011; Davis and Jurgenson, 2014). In most of
our offline conversations, we know who our audience is, so we can
predict the reach of our utterances and we can adjust what we say,
as well as the style in which we say it, to suit the context. Online,
25 For philosophical analyses of fake news, see Rini (2017), Mukerji
(2018), Habgood-Coote (2019), and Pepp et al. (2019). Fake news and
social capital work together – a user can share fake news to accrue social
capital, and then use that social capital to disseminate fake news even
further.
26 Habermas himself says little about the internet, and what he does say
is rather dismissive. In a famous footnote he suggests that the internet ‘has
certainly reactivated the grassroots of an egalitarian public of writers and
readers’, but that it also causes ‘the fragmentation of large but politically
focused mass audiences into a huge number of isolated issue publics’
(2006, p. 414, n.3).
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we can never be sure who or how many will hear us. We are rather
shouting into an audience of several billion, any number of whom
may potentially hear us. Thus there is no identifiable ‘context’.
This ‘context collapse’ was the case before ‘likes’ were introduced,
but ‘likes’ make it visible to social media users; they are given
evidence, via the ‘like’ metric, that people from multiple different
audiences could view their content. By making previously invisible
hearers visible, ‘likes’ remind us that online communication is a
kind of digital panopticon; you never know who is watching.
This context collapse means there is often no recognisable common
ground in online discourse. Philosophical analyses of offline conver-
sations typically assume that all participants in a conversation are
aware of each other’s presence, and work together to develop what
Robert Stalnaker calls a ‘common ground’ between them; throughout
the conversation they collaboratively construct a set of attitudes and
propositions mutually accepted by all conversational participants
(2002). Participants can take what is in this common ground for
granted, and this enables conversation to proceed at a fast pace.
Participants can presuppose the truth of claims already in the
common ground, rather than having to assert them outright every
time they speak.
If we are indiscriminate about the social connections we make
online, it will be hard to know what is in the common ground. And
if we do not know which beliefs we can safely presuppose or assert,
we will not know what content will get the most ‘likes’. One way
around this is to construct a cocoon of ‘followers’ and ‘friends’ who
share our world-view and thus who will want to read and then ‘like’
our content. To use C. Thi Nguyen’s terminology, these cocoons
could take the form of epistemic bubbles or echo chambers (2020a).
Epistemic bubbles are relatively homogeneous social epistemic struc-
tures, and echo chambers are epistemic bubbles combined with
systematic distrust of outsiders. Both can lead to more political polar-
isation and partisanship, though echo chambers pose more of a threat
to cross-partisan debate, because they make people deliberately
unwilling to listen to other viewpoints.
In this way, ‘likes’ may have made cross-partisan engagement less
likely, and contributed to the documented increasing political polar-
isation of Western societies (Pew Research Centre, 2014).27 That
27 Political polarisation is hard to measure, and studies that attempt to
do so should always be taken with a pinch of salt. The Pew Research
Centre study extrapolates from a survey of just 10,000 people, and acknowl-
edges the difficulties of defining terms like ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ in
20
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social media fosters political polarisation is not a new observation
(see, for example, Pariser, 2011; Sunstein, 2018), but what is new is
my suggestion that the ‘like’ function in particular has played an in-
strumental role in this phenomenon. This is because the ‘like’ button
reminds us constantly of our online social capital, and it strengthens
the cognitive and social incentives for producing content that accrues
many ‘likes’ – many will therefore adjust their circles (consciously or
subconsciously) in order to guarantee a steady stream of ‘likes’.28
Thus though ‘likes’ may generate a new kind of knowledge, and
make (superficial) engagement with others online easier, they also
‘gamify’ communication, making us inclined to pursue ‘likes’ at all
costs, regardless of whether we are sharing meaningful or true
content. They may also lead to increased polarisation, as we cultivate
homogenous online communities in which we can guarantee we will
receive ‘likes’. ‘Likes’ may ultimately not be that likeable after all.
4. Conclusion
In this paper I have offered a philosophical analysis of ‘liking’.
I began by considering what it means to ‘like’ a post and how we
might square this act with more familiar communicative practices.
I argued that, contrary to initial assumptions, ‘liking’ a post is not
the same as expressing that you like it (on neither cognitive nor
non-cognitive construals). Instead, ‘liking’ is best understood in
terms of its social function; we ‘like’ a post to signal that we have
seen it, and to anoint the positive face of the person who posted it.
In some contexts, ‘likes’ can do more than this, but their basic func-
tion is phatic rather than informative.
Next I considered how best to theorise the power that comes with
accrued ‘likes’. I suggested that accrued ‘likes’ are best modelled as
constituting and recording a kind of quantifiable, digital social
capital. This can explain why social media hasmade online sociability
ways that ensure different survey participants do not interpret questions in
different ways.
28 Among our bubbles, we may be more inclined to engage in practices
like virtue-signalling or moral grandstanding, acts which involve deliber-
ately making others aware of our moral and political virtues, because these
activities facilitate the easy accumulation of ‘likes’. These practices need
not be wrongful, but they can sometimes be hypocritical, and they also
can give one an unearned sense of moral accomplishment, which can lead
one to feel exempt from more thoroughgoing, sustained activism.
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a form of labour (most assiduously engaged in by ‘influencers’) and
why ‘likes’ are not directly translatable into economic capital but
nonetheless can make it easier to obtain.
Finally, I consideredwhether ‘likes’ have changed our communica-
tive practices for the better or for the worse. I ended on a pessimistic
note: ‘likes’ seem to have introduced a corrosive motivation into
online communication, encouraging us to pursue high ‘like’ tallies
at the expense of meaningful engagement. However, this may be
due to ‘like’ tallies in particular, rather than to the ‘like’ function
itself. The latter seems rather innocuous (even if it does promote a
kind of communicative laziness). Tallies, in contrast, seem to
gamify sociality and play to our psychological weaknesses. So what
we should do about this? Some social media users take active steps
to reduce the impact of ‘like’ tallies by installing extensions like the
Facebook Demetricator, which hides all metrics, and some social
media platforms have experimented with removing tallies from
users’ newsfeeds.29 These are positive developments, even if they
risk dramatically disrupting the distribution and measurement of
online social capital. It is good to ‘like’ each other, but only if this
does not stand in the way of actually liking each other.
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